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A PRÉCIS OF KANT AND HIS THINKING

FROM
THE PANORAMA OF THINKING

"Man is a reed, but he is a thinking reed," said Blaise Pascal. Thinking sets man apart from the rest of the universe. It is really man's most important function. Solomon says in Proverbs 23:7:"As he thinketh in his heart, so is he!..." In other words, as one reckons within himself, so is his character--and his deeds. Even one's life, with its impact in the world, is determined by his thinking. Then the process of thinking and its product, or thought, is really a priceless jewel.

In this treatise the theme is not to be thought, or the product of thinking, but the process itself of thinking. How we apprehend phenomena, understand, judge, and evaluate them is the main consideration. Nor do we intend to consider the biology or, to any great extent, the psychology of thinking. Not even the experts in those fields have been able to discover very much of what the brain and other organs do in the process.. The connection of bodily organs with thinking, so far, has managed to elude the experts.

Naturally, there arises the question of what the mind is. Certainly, it is, to the best of our ability to ascertain, the psychic and mental center of the person, or being. The mind, although it in many ways affects the body and its functions, eludes detection by the five senses.

The plan of this study is to discover and evaluate the thinking processes, or schemes, of a dozen thinkers, or philosophers, who summarized, articulated, and produced the prevailing thinking of their times. Others were more or less of the same mind as they, but these giants discussed in our treatise gave detailed schemes of the thinking current in their times. They, more or less, affected, or even molded, the thinking of most succeeding eras.

There has been a definite developing stream of thinking processes, as one thinker trained, or otherwise influenced those who followed him. Leaving out such persons as Abraham, Moses, and Paul, who dealt mainly with what is called "revelation,"

we begin with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, considering Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dewey, and Sartre. Therefore, we entitle our treatise THE PANORAMA OF THINKING.

In this paper we deal with Immanuel Kant and his thinking. He has been termed one of the greatest of thinkers, equal in depth and scope to the Greek giants and the colossus of the Thirteenth Century, St. Thomas Aquinas. In my estimation, Kant is the greatest of them all in the area of actual thinking. He goes into intimate detail in describing the way we apprehend, understand, and judge phenomena and reason on the basis of the truths discovered. In the main, he is concerned with the forms of thinking. In fact no other has ever placed so much emphasis on the actual processes of thinking. True, Aristotle used some of the ideas, such as categories, used by Kant. And Hegel, although he criticized them severely, used some of Kant's categories himself.

As to Kant's life and work, we speak briefly. He was born in Konigsberg, East Prussia, in 1724. His grandfather had emigrated from Scotland to East Prussia. His father and mother belonged to a religious group called Pietists. Kant himself was a quiet, sober, religious man, deeply concerned about morals. Never in his life of eighty years did he leave East Prussia. He never married. His life was very simple. He was content with a room in which there was a bed, a table, a chair and some of his books. None of the luxuries of life ever appealed to him. He said that he was happy "with the starry heavens above him and the moral law within him." His habits were mechanically regular. For example, he took a walk every day in such a punctilious manner that it is said the housekeepers along the streets on which he walked set their clocks as he passed their houses. When the weather was wet or cold, he took his walk, anyway. Somethimes a servant would go beside, or behind, him holding an umbrella over him. It is said that he never missed his walk by twice--once on the day when a copy of Rousseau' Émile reached him and he stayed at home to read it; the second time was on the day when he heard that the French Revolution had begun and he stayed at home to await further news.

His work consisted almost entirely of teaching and writing. Because he became well-known as a brilliant student, with wit and humor, he became tutor to several famous members of the Prussian nobility. He became a teacher in the University of Konigsberg, for many years a teacher of physics and then head of the Department of Philosophy. He became famous, not only in East Prussia, but also among thinkers of the entire world and entertained many of them in Konigsberg.

The writings of Kant consist of three critiques and various treatises on morality and social justice. His three critiques are his most important works. The first was his Critique of Pure Reason, the greatest of all his works. He published it in 1781 after eleven years of reseach and study. When he was ready , he sat down and wrote the work of approximately seven hundred pages in a very brief period of time. This work deals with the possibilities and limitations of pure reason, criticizing the processes of reaching truth and evaluating it, indicating clearly and finally the limitations of pure reasons in areas beyond phenomena. The second critique deals with the practical aspects of reason outside the range of pure reason and phenomena. It is entitled The Critique of Practical Reason. The third critique, The Critique of Judgment, deals with the criticism of thinking in the two areas of aesthetics(phenomena), or design in nature, and purpose, or teleology.

To give a picture of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, we use the figure of a great oak tree, which we shall call the "thinking tree." Let us consider the system of roots in the ground, the massive trunk of the tree and then its great boughs, limbs and smaller branches. The roots of the tree, which obtain the elements essential to its life, growth and fruitage, correspond to the sense-perceptions of the mind by which we gain raw knowledge, or truth about phenomena. The trunk corresponds to apprehension, understanding and judgment of truth. The boughs, small limbs and twigs, with the leaves and fruit, are like reason, which determines courses of action as a result of the truth received, or reflects on the value of the truths. Thus we have determinate reason and reflective reason.

Now Kant had made a startling discovery, which shocks one when he first comes in contact with it. That discovery is called "Copernican Revolution," which makes man the center of everything, as Copernicus made the sun the center of the solar system. Philosophers before Kant had thought of man as having to adapt himself to the universe of phenomena. But, according to Kant, for man to apprehend truth in the universe, the universe must conform to man's mental equipment. This mental equipment consists of concepts of space and time and certain intuitions, or categories, which enable the sense-perceptions to apprehend and pass on to the higher faculties of the mind the concepts of phenomena. The equipment native to man, which enables him to receive these empirical truths, is a priori, or prior to the concepts of phenomena. It is also transcendental, or consisting of forms only by which we apprehend phenomena, This discovery is the basis of Kant's philosophy, in which he seeks to lay a foundation in reason for scientific research and conclusions and for religious faith to have a reasonable acceptance in life and practice.

Descartes had begun his reasoning by discarding everything about which there was any doubt. He had left only his ego, the "I" or subject. He enunciated the principles upon which he began his reasoning: "I think; therefore I am." Shortly, the question arose about what the ego is. William Turner, in his History of Philosophy, says that Descartes laid bare a chasm between the subject and the object which every philosoper since that time has labored in vain to span. Kant, in answer, said that it is impossible to think except on the background of phenomena, which, if true, destroys Descartes' principle. Kant took up the problem of the relation of the subject and the object with a vengeance. Accordingly, in spite of what William Turner says, I believe that Kant has done as good work as is humanly possible to bridge that chasm between the subject and the object. (This we shall see in Kant's "Transcendental Analytic".) He deals with ultimate realities, or items beyond the empirical universe, in his Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment.

Aristotle thought that a judgment is true only when it corresponds to the facts of reality.

(This is the Correspondence Theory of Truth.) Kant's problem, then, was to know when our ideas correspond to the world if all we know of the world is our idea of it. We must know the world and the ideas and compare the two. However, we can never chaeck the correspondence. Kant solves the problem by making the world conform to the mind. In other works, the world that we kmow has to correspond to the patterns of our understanding. Otherwise, we cannot know the things in the universe. All else is unknown to us. We cannot know it.

Hume had denied the existence of phenomena. All things were things-in-themselves, noumena. But there was no clear and definite understanding of things-in-themselves. Since, therefore, we cannot understand clearly and accurately things-in-themselves, Hume asserted that we can know nothing for certain. (This roused Kant to bestir himself and write his critiques.) To illustrate this difficulty, take, for example, the three blind men and the elephant. One felt its tail and said that the elephant was like a rope; the second felt the trunk and said the elephant was like a large snake; and the third felt its side and said that it was like a wall. This illustrates the truth that people do not understand things alike. In other words, our faculties of discernment are not always reliable. Things are not what they seem.

Kant said that he would show that things can be known for certain. Whereas Hume had made scientific research of no real value, Kant would show that it is not olny possible but also practical to know things for certain. Hence we have scientific research that establishes workable principles in almost every field of endeavor. (He deals with this problem in the Critique of Pure Reason.) Kant was disturbed also that Hume, Locke, Berkely, and others, in their research and conclusions, had left no place for religious faith. (He addresses this problem in the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment.)

With our concept of the "thinking tree" in mind, we proceed to Kant's solution of the problem of the apprehension of phenomena. He begins with space and time and then takes up in detail how our sense-mechanisms enable us to apprehend phenomena. Space,

time, and intuitions, and things that accompany those intuitions, as we have indicated, are a part of our natural equipment, which come with us and are preconditions of our apprehending and understanding phenomena. They are definitely not a part of the world of phenomena. Neither can they be apprehended by the five senses. (Things that can be apprehended by the five senses are said to be a posteriori, which include all phenomena.)

THE AESTHETIC

Space is something inside us, a condition for our visualizing objects, out there, as we say,"in space." It does not depend on world objects, which are perceived as already in space in the first place. Space is therefore the subjective condition of our perception of the external world. It is the a priori condition of all phenomena for us. It is a subjective form whih we provide. There is no space without our minds to see space. This explains the binding nature of geometry. Space is empirically real and transcendentally ideal. It is a condition of our perceptive apparatus.

Time is also an a priori form of our perceptive apparatus, making possible all our reception of sense-images. Time has only one dimension, and there is only one time span. Different "times" are but successive parts of one time, never simultaneous; different "spaces" are simultaneous in time, never succeeding one another. Time is then a condition that we impose, empirically real and transcendentally ideal.

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

"Sensation receives images and the understanding combines them into thoughts." Both elements are required for thought. When the images are derived from the objects of experience, the resulting thought is empirical, a posteriori. But when the images are independent of experience(as in mathematics), the resulting thought is pure. (For example, when I was a boy, we studied mental arithmetic in school. We solved problems without any written or spoken figures before we recited them.) Sensation is a passive function,since it merely receives information. The understanding, on the

other hand, is an active function, because it combines the images into thoughts. Thought alone, without its content of images, is empty. Sense-intuitions alone, without concepts to unify them into thought, are blind. These two faculties cannot exchange their functions. The understanding cannot see; the senses cannot think.

Transcendental logic, therefore, deals with the conditions of understanding. It is here that we must seek the criteria of truth. The analysis of this understanding (which takes its information from experience) is called "transcendental analytic." When thought goes beyond experience and ventures into pure reason, the errors are exposed in what we call "transcendental dialectic."

Now back to our thinking tree we go to explain its different parts and functions. The concepts of the understanding, drawn from the roots of the tree, are put together in the trunk of the tree where they form manifolds and come out as judgments. Our concern next is to determine the possible kinds of judgments. Then we examine the various forms of our understanding. Since all our thoughts must comform to these possible kinds of judgments, we can determine our ways of understanding experienced reality. The categories, or intuitions, of our understanding therefore must be derived from the possible kinds of judgment.

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

There are four groups of judgments that are analyzed as to quantity, quality, relation and modality. Each of these groups consists of three judgments. The categories, or modes of understanding, correspond to the necessary judgments. These taelve judgments and corresponding categories make understanding possible. Kant seems to be correct in this.(But he himself said the process of understanding is rather difficult to comprehend.) Here we have the list of the judgments and corresponding categories, with their schemata and principles, to which we shall refer from time to time.

(Insert list here)

All these processes took place in the roots and trunk of the tree. But let us examine these judgments and corresponding categories. Judgments analyzed as to quan-

tity are as follows: In a universal judgment we speak of all men(or all of any items). Of course, the corresponding category is unity. A particular judgment would indicate some, with the category of plurality, and the singular judgment, one, with the category of totality. In like manner judgments of quality would be: Affirmative, with the category of reality; the negative, with the category of negation; and the infinite with the category of limitation. Also the judgments of relation are as follows: Categorical with the category of inherence and subsistence; the hypothetical with the category of causality and dependence; and the disjunctive with the category of community or interaction. Fianlly the judgments of modality: Problematic, using the category of possibility or impossibility; assertoric and the category of existence or non-existence; and the apodeictic with necessity and contingency.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

The categories are necessary for all thought. "Transcendental" means"non-empirical." "Deduction" means "justification." Therefore, we have a non-empirical justification ~~justification~~ for the categories. No object can be thought of without one or more categories of the understanding. These categories are forms of understanding, native to the mind, not dependent on experience. They are prior to the intake of sense-information. They filter the sense-information into the trunk of the tree.

In order for thought to take place, I must be able to think of it. I cannot think a thought without at least being able to think about my own thinking, also. Kant says the "I think" must be able to accompany sense-images. When I think:"This is a tree", I must be able to think:"I think this is a tree." It is not necessary to think of myself thinking every time I have a thought; it must be merely possible for me to be able to do so. Kant calls this required possibility of self-consciousness "The Transcendental Unity of Apperception." What this means is that my self-consciousness, as an 'I', is an essential part of my thinking.

For Hume mind is nothing but its acts, which would mean that when there is no thinking, there is no mind. For Kant, on the other hand, understanding is possible mm

only if there is possibility of self-consciousness beforehand, a priori. It must be possible for a mind that can say,"I think," to be there before thought can take place.

Since the understanding creates unity of apperception, this thinking about my thinking is itself something that relies on the categories. The categories of the understanding as pure concepts, without content, must have the faculty of imagination involved with that of the understanding and sensation. Imagination is the function that connects the categories with reality and gives us methods of applying these pure concepts.

These methods of applying pure concepts to reality are called schemata, which is the plural for schema, or scheme. "A schema is a procedure of the imagination for finding an image that will make a concept meaningful and connect it with reality." In geometry, for example, in order to make a concept clear, we must draw a picture, or figure. Now there must be a rule for constructing such a picture and for applying it--and this is what a schema is. It is a way of making a concept graphic. (We think of a one-minute camera picture. The schema is the peculiar process of bringing out the picture by a chemical action. The process in the mind, whatever it is(it does not have to be chemical), that brings out the clear concept, is the schema.) The schemata of the categories must have special characteristics: Since time is the condition(as in the picture) common to all natural consciousness (and thus is basis to all knowledge), schemata must involve time in some way.

We saw the categories derived from the judgments. Now the schemata, in a very loose way, will be suggested by the categories. The schemata do not say all there is to be said about categories. They are merely illustrative devices.(See page 8A)

The schema for the categories of quantity is number. Number is the way we compare quantities. This involves measurement and addition, which involves a process in time.

The schema for the categories of quality is intensity. It is in degree of inten-

sity that we compare qualities. A "tone" or a "color" can have different degrees of intensity, different degrees of reality, all the way down to nothing(negation). Reality is --when we"imagine," schematize it--a being in time.

Considering schemata for the categories of relation, we have: The schema for the category of inherence and subsistence is the way we actually describe it in speaking of categories, that is, inherence and subsistence can be imagined in terms of a substance which underlies its various properties through all its changes--as when a plant grows, bears seeds, turns brown and dies. All these properties "inhere" in the one substantial plant. The schema(or rule for producing an image) is permanence in time. The schema for the category of causality is that of succession in time. "Causality means," we tell the inexperienced person, "that every time you take cyandide you die." In causality there is succession in which B follows A, regualrly. This is as far as Hume would go in explaining causation--which means that he went as far as schemata only, not to the <u>a priori</u> principle of it. The schema for community, interaction--whereby two objects determine each other and are determined by each other--is coexistence in time. (For example, marriage of a man and a woman to make marriage.)

The schemata for the category of modality are three-fold: The schema for possibility is possibility in time, not merely logical possibility. When we imagine something being possible, we think of it in time. The schema for existence is at a certain time. And the schema for the category of necessity is that of being an object for all time. That is, when we think of a"necessary truth," we think of one that endures forever.

As to the principles of understanding, in pure logic, which uses analytic judgments, the highest principle is merely the negative criterion which goes by the name of "the principle of non-contradiction"(also called "the principle of contradiction"). It states that two opposite statements cannot be true, and that a given statement cannot be both true and false at the same time. But this is an abstract criterion. It is merely formal, analytic, and teaches us nothing about the world.

The highest principle of synthetic judgments(those that do inform us about the world) is the connection with experience. But experience, as we saw, depends on synthesis, or combination, of sensory information. Without such a synthesis, Kant says, we have nothing but a"rhapsody of perceptions." This synthesis can take place only in accordance with the principles of understanding."(Cf. the principle by which the oak tree grows as it does with root system, trunk, boughs, limbs and twigs with leaves on them.)

Kant's question(How is pure mathematics possible?) was answered in the transcendental aesthetic by showing that space is an a priori condition of our perceptive apparatus--and it is to this apparatus that both mathematics-in-the-world and mathematics-in-the-mind must conform. The second question(How is pure natural science possible?) is answered here in the transcendental analytic. Pure science is possible only because the world conforms to certain a priori principles of the understanding, by which our objective experience is structured.

(See page 8A)

Principles of quantity: Corresponding to the categories of quantity, we have a priori principles which Kant calls"axioms of intuition"(using "intuition" to mean"sense-perceptions"). Here all perceptions are seen as extensive magnitudes.(Cf. inches, miles, pounds, etc.). With these we can perform certain mathematical operations, such as those in arithmetic and geometry.) For Kant the fact that all perceptions can be seen in terms of extensive magnitudes explains why mathematics-in-the-world would correspond to mathematics-in-the-mind. It is that the world of our experience structures itself in such a way as to be measurable. This makes mathematics one of the underlying subjective conditions of our objective experience.

Principles of quality: Here we have the principles called the "anticipations of perception," wherein all perceptions are seen as intensive magnitudes, displaying different degrees of intensity in their properties.(Such magnitudes as age, degree of intelligence, hardness of metals, etc.) The fact that perceptions can be seen in [illegible] means that sensations are capable of being measured,

thus making an expermental psychology possible. Since all perceptions can have extensive and intensive magnitudes, we can predict future aspects of our perceptions.

Principles of relation: Corresponding to the categoroes of relation, we have the principles called "analogies of experience." These invole seeing our experience in terms of relations between objects. The category of inherence, or substance, tells us that the underlying condition of all change is a substance that is permanent in time: every animal, for example, undergoes change, yet keeps its identity. The category of causality tells us that in all change there is a causal relation between objects. The category of community tells us that in all change there is interaction between objects. Permanence, succession(of effect to cause), and simultaneity(the coexistence of interaction) are modes of being in time.

Principles of Modality: Corresponding to the categories of modality, we have the principles called "postulates of empirical thought in general." Corresponding to the category of possibility is: That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience (as to perception and thought) is possible. This means that whatever fails to fulfill these requirements cannot be an object of experience. So nothing can be taken as phenominally real(that is, appearing in our experience) which does not correspond to the forms of sensation. Related to the second postulate, corresponding to the category of existence: That which is connected to the material conditions of experience is real. The third postulate corresponding to the category of necessity in that which is determined by the universal conditions of experience, exists necessarily. These postulates do not concern logical possiblility or logical necessity, but empirical possibility and empirical necessity. This means that we cannot make scientific statements about that which does not enter our experience. This does not rule out the existence of non-empirical entities(such as gods, ghosts or gremlins). It does, however, rule the possibility of our knowing them.

(Kant refutes the problematic idealism of Descartes, under which we cannot prove the existence of the world. He also refutes the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, who

held that space and all things in it are nothing but ideas of mine(or God's). He answered Descartes by saying that inner experience is possible only through outer experience. As to Berkeley, Kant shows that there is a world of objects, both in and beyond our experience: phenomena and noumena.)

This takes us back to the categories. In order to have scientific knowledge, we must apply these principles to sense-impressions. Our progress from judgments to categories, to schemata, to principles presents us with a structure in which each level connects the levels at either side. Principles connect schemata to sense-impressions, schemata apply categories to principles(and then to sense-impressions), and the categories permit us to make judgments about schemata, principles, and sense-impressions. All this answers the second question as to how pure science is possible. Since our experience must always conform to these principles, we know that these principles always hold true, and that our experience will always conform(since what does not conform cannot be known). It is these synthetic a priori principles that are the most basic laws of nature. This, then, is the fulfillment of that "Copernican insight" of Kant's. "The principles of possible experience, then, are at the same time universal laws of nature, which can be known a priori and thus the problem of our second question(How is pure natural science possible?) is solved.

Physics depends on the consistency of nature's laws to the extent that the physical laws will continue to hold in the future as they have in the past. Hume says that this consistency of nature cannot be prived by observations, because observations tell us only what has happened so far. How, then, could any law of nature be binding on the future? Thus Hume gives these laws no objective status. Contrarywise, Kant now shows this law-abiding character of nature to be an objective quality of nature wherever nature enters our experience. In this"Copernican approach" Kant overcomes the problem of how laws apply to the world by saying that mind legislates to the world.

Although the principles and categories are not provable empirically, they can be

used empirically; that is, they can be applied to the world of experience.[14] This means that the synthetic a priori of substance and causality can be used only in the world we know.(Consider the principles of electricity.)

Is the noumenal world possible? One reason Kant must accept the abstract possibility of the existence of the noumenal world is to avoid the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, in which the world(beyond my consciousness of it) is not really there. Another reason that Kant must posit a noumenal world-that-conforms-to -our-minds is that it must first be there if it can conform. Otherwise, if we say that it is there only at the moment it conforms(à la Kerkely), we fall down the solipsistic pit. So the world-in-itself must be there, although we cannot even say it is there--since the categories cannot be applied beyond our experience.

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

The purpose of the transcendental dialectic is to demonstrate the ways in which pure reason is improperly used--that is, when it is extended beyond the limits of our experience. Accordingly, Kant will answer his third and fourth questions(How is metaphysics possible in general, as a human disposition? and How is metaphysics possible as a science?) by showing that as a human disposition or inclination to go beyond the limits of experience, metaphysics is entirely natural. But if it is extended beyond experience, metaphysics is entirely without a basis and cannot be a science. This means that there can be no scientific foundation(in experience) for ideas of ultimate reality, such as God, freedom and immortality.

Now we pass into the boughs and limbs of our "thinking tree"and reason about all phenomena, sometimes to plan and purpose courses of action, conduct or thought, or to reflect on what we have discovered or experienced. Thus we have determinate reason and reflective reason. Obviously, reflective reason, or the reason about experiences, may become determinate reason for the next task or project.

We may climb into the topmost branches of the tree, but that is as far as we can go. We cannot demonstrate truth beyond experience. When I was a boy, I used to climb the tallest tree available, look from the topmost limb and wonder what it would be

like to be able to go right on up into the blue. This is what we are inclined to try to do with pure reason, But we cannot go in pure reason beyond experience(the interpretation of phenomena). However, there is another type of reason--practical reason--which we shall explore eventually. Whereas, we may consider jumping from the boughs of the tree into empty space, as we do when we attempt to reach ultimate realities by pure reason, we shall find that practical reason will suggest a bridge on which to pass to items that cannot be apprehended by the five senses.

In the transcendental dialectic first there are certain necessary things to consider, certain abstract forms of thought, certain bare categories of understanding, whose function is merely that of giving shape to our thoughts, but not giving any content.

When these abstract forms are extended beyond experience, it is these empty forms themselves that will generate such concepts as "soul", "cosmos", and "God". Abstract logical forms will actually produce specific content! Thus we find the mind's natural disposition toward metaphysics.

Secondly, once we leave the world of experience, there is no constraint on our thinking: we can think anything, and there is no way of knowing whether it is true. We can prove and disprove certain metaphysical ideas. (In the world of experience such a contradiction could not exist.)"Proving" both sides of these metaphysical arguments reduces the arguments to absurdity. The transcendental dialectic, therefore is a false discipline. Its aim is to reveal the fact that pure reason("pure" in the sense that it is beyond experience) has no scientific grounds in the conclusions that it reaches, and that the "knowledge" it comes to can be nothing but illusion.

As to the unconditioned, we are always seeking reasons why. (Cf. What makes a bird stay up when it flies?) When we get out of the bounds of experience, we can give no further conditions.(Cf. Soul, world, God.) (By putting one's own content into a syllogism, he can "prove" anything.) That it is natural for us to seek the unconditioned does not make such tendencies the basis of scientific knowledge.

Kant says that an empirical ego would be observable, capable of demonstration and

an object of knowledge. But the "I think" is a transcendental ego--only a required condition of thinking. It is nothing but a logical subject that is not a predicate of anything. It is therefore free of all corrective conditioning: it cannot be an observable phenomenon. It must remain beyond experience, noumenal, so that it can be morally responsible. We must think of it as a mere presupposition. We cannot know it. The "soul" is beyond our experience, as is "God."

The first paralogism--the soul as a substance: The "I" is the subject of my judgments, and is never a predicate of anything else. There can be confusion between the soul and a logical subjedt of a sentence and the idea of the soul as an actual substance. The transcendental ego(as the foundation of thinking) cannot be known directly. It is not a substance.

Second paralogism: I conceive myself as being different from the objects outside me. I am here, and they are there. Can I therefore say that I am simething apart? I cannot differentiate myself except by presupposing that the world is out there and that I am a part of it. I cannot think of myself in isolation from the world, a being whose sole nature is to think(as for Descartes).

We can retain for ourselves the idea of a soul--indeed, we must retain it for ethical and practical purposes. But we cannot base a pure science upon it.

The antinomies of cosmology are conditions about the world similar to those about the soul. The concern whether the world is infinite or finite in space; whether every composite substance is composed of simple parts, or no composite thing is composed of simple parts; whether the phenomena of the world must be explainable not only according to the laws of nature but also according to the causality of freedom, or there is no freedom and everything happens strictly according to the laws of nature; and whether as a part of the universe or its cause, there is a Being with an absolutely necessary existence, who is the cause of the universe--either within the universe or outside of it.

Either the thesis or the antithesis can be proved in each of these cases, which renders proof absurd. Therefore, pure reason has no power to prove or disprove these

four items.

In the transcendental dialectic Kant answers his third and fourth questions: He shows that metaphysics is possible as a human inclination, but not as a science, no matter whose side he is on. (A freshman girl was being criticized by her professor for saying that she believed that God created the world. He said to her, "There is no way to prove it." She countered, "There is no way to prove that God did not create the world and man." The professor had no more to say.) It is with this very conclusion that Kant ends his seven-hundred-page Critique of Pure Reason. Pure reason, the reason of science, cannot prove or disprove ultimate realities. Reason unifies our understanding (as the understanding unifies our sense experience) to provide the structural forms for our scientific investigations. It can therefore stimulate research--provided only that it will not predict the content of that research. Pure reason is not so much for the discovery of truth as it is the prevention of error.

PRACTICAL REASON

In beginning his explanation of practical reason, Kant asks three profound questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope? The first of these has been answered in the first critique by defining the limits and possibilities of pure reason. The second and third quastions he now attempts to answer in the Critique of Practical Reason and in the Critique of Judgment. In the first critique Kant states the practical goal of all his philosophical work by indicating that the problem of the Highest Good (Summum Bonum) is the ultimate goal of pure reason.

As his approach to scientific truth through research is the problem of the first critique, so his approach to the problem of ethics seeks to construct a system of morality in terms of a priori elements. He asks: Is morality a kind of knowledge?

Hume said that what is is a body of knowledge, and that what ought to be is not knowledge--and cannot be verified. How, therefore, can morality have a cognitive a priori basis? How does morality presume to know what we ought to do?--if all we can know is what is.

Kant uses his "Copernican Reversal" in the second and third critiques also to solve the problem. He does not make moral knowledge conform to facts, but makes facts conform to to principles that are a part of us. Leaving what is and addressing what ought to be, we lay down a prescriptive discipline that precedes facts because it is based on a priori elements.

Let us examine two examples:

First, when I was a student at Peabody College in Nashville in 1926, just about the time that the philosophy of John Dewey began to take hold on education, I attended a meeting of school administrators, in which there arose the question of a code of ethics for the moral conduct of public schools. After considerable argument, it was decided that a questionaire consisting of a number of moral questions be sent to a large number of school administrators. The answers to these questions would be consolidated into the proposed code of ethics. (They could not think of a better way to find what moral conduct of teachers and pupils should be.) The fellow student with whom I walked back to the dormitory commented to me,"Those guys are all going to hell! That is no way to find out what is right!" He and I knew that there was something wrong with this procedure for ascertaining what is moral. However, we, in our young minds, did not have a clear idea of what was wrong. Some will say, of course,"Well, are not men like those educators capable of saying what is right?" For the sake of argument, we may say,"Yes." But what about the following experience?

Suppose that we agree that vandalism, stealing and murder are wrong. Some years ago I found a community in my travels where almost all the numerous inhabitants were practical outlaws. Any person moving into that out-of-the-way place would feel constrained to adapt himself to the customs of his neighbors--and some did just that. In a short time that community furnished half the inmates of the state penitentiary because the inhabitants persisted in their unethical ways of life.

In both these communities human conduct was descriptive, or empirical--derived from experience. They needed, as all society needs, prescriptive morals. After all, is there a [illegible] of society? Can a whole society be wrong? (Or, is such

morality really moral at all?)

According to Kant, man's behavior may change, but this change has no effect on what is right or wrong. We do not find out what is right and wrong by a show of hands! Right is right if nobody is right! (Consider Nazi Germany, based on the philosophy of Nietzsche.)

Kant's a priori, or prescriptive, ethics says that moral knowledge is not affected by changing institutions. He says that we have a priori elements implicit in our ethical judgments, whether we know it or not. We are dealing with a mental faculty, with categories and forms. We are dealing with pure reason in general, which now deals with a special area in practical knowledge. (The word "practical" does not refer to what is useful or expedient, but rather to activity in general, as when one speaks of a doctor's "practice".) Practical knowledge is necessary for making ethical decisions--not merely for knowing theoretically what is ethical.

Kant shows that moral behavior is the identification of will with reason; that is, willing by a rule provided by reason. Applying formal rules to ethical choices involves the problem of first isolating the a priori elements in moral judgments themselves.

These elements are not found in day-to-day happenings, nor from empirical concepts of a higher order, such as "human nature." Nor are they based on special social norms, or even on a feeling of what is right and proper. All these are merely forms of what is. The ought is found in the concepts of pure reason. The faculty of understanding deals with the factual experience, which is what is. But pure reason is a regenerative faculty. (Here we are very close to revelation.) By faith, according to practical reason, we may accept norms as right and proper, and govern ourselves accordingly. As a regenerative faculty , pure reason is perfect for going beyond experience and and dealing with the "ought". As mathematics lays down forms of experience to follow, so ethical rules will not be derived from man's factual experience, but will lay down the laws to which man's ethical behavior will conform. As in science we legislate to nature, so we legislate morals by pure reason.

Kant says that he is concerned to find the a priori rational basis of all moral judgments as such. This takes him into his major ethical work, the Critique of practical Reason, 1788. Here he follows the plan of the first critique with "analytic," "dialectic" and "method," using categories, not of the understanding, but of freedom as they relate to good and evil. There will be a noumenal thing-in-itself--the good will, which is the good in and by itself. It is defined as a will conforming to moral duty.

The basis for the whole idea of moral conduct may be compared to a "moral" tree, somewhat like the "thinking" tree in pure reason. The trunk of the tree is freedom. Then there are limbs of reason, will, duty, categorical imperative and conscience--all of them inhering in freedom. Let us examine these parts of the tree.

As we may easily see in every-day life, man is free--sometimes free within certain limits--yet free enough to be responsible for his actions. To illustrate: A friend of mine, when he was a little boy, sat on the back pew in the church with an older boy, who was hired to care for him. One day during the sermon, this little boy bit the ear of his caretaker. The yell that ensued almost broke up the church service. After the service the little boy's mother, in questioning him about his unsocial conduct, asked, "Whoever gave you the idea to bite Bill's ear in church?" His reply was,"Nobody gave me the idea; I did that on my own." We could multiply examples of the exercise of freedom, but it is everywhere evident that man is free.

In general, freedom is identified with the faculty of reason, by which we decide what is right and wrong. Reason is an a priori function that enables us to figure out a pattern of conduct. The information that we have, or that we may obtain, is used by reason in rendering its determinations, or in reflection, as the case may be.

Will, also, is free, or should be free. By our will we execute our deeds or thoughts of life and practice. If our will is good, we will do the good. If it is not good, we do wrong.

Duty is also nurtured in freedom. By the voice of duty we do what is right because it is right. If there is some ulterior motive, or if there are unbearable pressures, the will is enslaved and ~~do~~ may not do right. Duty demands that what is right be done. There is no place in duty for situation ethics. Duty is bases solely on principle and must be universal in scope, that is, it is proper for all men at all times.

Then, there is the categorical imperative, or moral monitor, that is closely associated with duty and the other elements of freedom. The categorical imperative says, "Act, not for the sake of an end, but act for the sake of duty--do it because it is right." This categorical imperative is already implicit in us--so that when we legislate for ourselves, we legislate for all men. The real principle of the categorical imperative is the concept that every human being is an end in himself, and that each person is to be treated as such. He must not be used as an instrument to serve my purposes.

Finally, there is the conscience which is a judge and tells us what is right and wrong. Even primitive people know what is right and wrong. Their conduct does not always conform to conscience because of outside influences and internal inclinations of one kind or another. The woman with twins, one sick and the other well, who throws the well one into the Ganges because she has been told and constrained to do so that the deed may make the sick one well, has a strong compunction of conscience. She knows within herself that she is wrong--although she has been pressured into doing what she did. Outlaws know that they are wrong. Their ideas may not always be clear because of false information and outside pressures. But deep down inside they know they are wrong. By all this, we see that there is human freedom. It is an essential postulate of practical reason.

Now there is another postulate, "as if." The unconditioned is the highest good which practical reason tells us we must pursue. It is, however, only an ideal good, a perfection that is unattainable in a mere human lifetime . Since it is an infinite good, it would take an infinite time to approach it. To approach it, therefore, we must postulate an infinite time and a soul that never dies.(I think he is wrong here.

Why not argue for the necessity of immortality to even up inequalities and to make other necessary adjustments?)

As to the postulate of God, which he says in absolutely necessary, we need an idea that will somehow connect our virtuous behavior with ultimate happiness. This requires the unconditioned idea of a Benevolent Creator,Who harmonizes our desires with the great scheme of things--an Intelligence that will unify man's will with nature's necessity. (Here Kant carries the "Copernican Revolution" too far.) His contention that the moral law that inheres in us a priori brings the idea of God into being got him into trouble. I think what he really meant to say was that the moral law within us indicates to us that there is a God. His greatest mistake in this area is that he fails to take account of human weakness and limitation.)

He says that we need a concept of God to enable us to think of a larger, purposeful scheme of creation. This demands a Creator, although it does not prove His existence. In short, moral law implies a Lawgiver. Law does not come to be of itself. A wise Intelligence must have provided that law which works so efficiently in the area of morals.

It would seem that God in reconciling man's will with nature's necessity--or human"purposes" with nature's"purposes". This reconciliation of the two areas is made possible by the fact that we make judgments in which the "purposes" of nature are seen as conforming to our own(Copernican Revolution)--as when we realize that the seasons are of use to mankind. How such judgments are possible, and whether these have status as knowledge, is the theme of the Critique of Judgment.

Man lives in a realm of freedom as well as in a realm of determination. Man's will is unable to be known empirically because it is noumenal. It is therefore, it is free and undetermined. On the one hand man's body is a part of nature, which is mechanical and determined. Man directs himself toward goals in the future, being the "to be", or end-oriented. Man is oriented by final causes. Can these two view-points be harmonized?

Teleology and mechanism are opposed, just as man and nature are opposed. Human

laws can be disobeyed (free will); nature's laws cannot be disobeyed. When we see apparent exceptions to a law of nature, they are exceptions only because we do not understand their lawfulness. "Man and nature are reconciled in man's purposive judgments about nature: Science seeks to organize its information into a systematic unity--and this unity, indicating a unity in nature which we regard "as if" it were the artifice of an intelligent Creator. This "as if" intelligence in nature somehow comforms to our own intelligence" (Copernican Revolution).

This purposiveness appears to be inherent in nature. Did this get there of itself? Kant admits in his Critique of Judgment that organic nature will never be explained in mechanical terms: "We will never know," he says, "the prior causes that go into the making of a blade of grass," although he hopes for such an explanation as the goal for science. We are forced, therefore, in the absence of mechanistic explanation, to rely on teleological explanation--although this is not truly scientific. Such explanation is pre-scientific.

All indication of purpose or design in nature is beyond the realm of scientific explanation. Nature's apparent intelligence and purposiveness is a matter for pure reason--not for science. It is because nature conforms to the unprovable patterns of pure reason that it is possible and plausible for man to appreciate nature's "intelligence." There are two kinds of purposiveness: one external to itself (rain makes the crops grow) and an inner purposiveness (as that a clover has three leaves) more characteristic of organic nature. There is no blind mechanism in this, but such purposiveness is sometimes mysterious. But surely, mechanism explains in terms of antecedent causes, causes prior to the event. But teleology explains in terms of ultimate, or final, causes after the event. (Why does it rain? Atmospheric conditions. Why does it rain? To make the crops grow.)

A concept of God is the most satisfying explanation of a system of order, and ends. Thus, teleology finds its most appropriate basis in theology. (Kant purposely avoids theological terms and thought forms, for he is strictly a philosopher. But he must have been at heart a very ardent believer in God because he held that God is necessary for the

completion of his system of thought.)

Ultimately, the need for a belief in God is a moral one; the world is a stage for man's action; we see this stage as designed for presenting man in his moral drama when we see him as the ultimate purpose of creation itself. As the apex of human morality, we seek a vista of the cosmos in which God has created man and the world for some higher purpose. (This is not "scientific" but it opens wide the way for faith.)

Thomas Mann's epitome of this view is given in Kantian words in Mann's obituary notice in the New York Times, August 13, 1955:"I believe that the creation of the universe out of nothingness, and that of life out of an organic state, ultimately aimed at the creation of man. I believe that man is meant as a great experiment, whose possible failure by man' s own guilt would be(tantamount) to the failure of creation itself. Whether this belief be true or not, man would be well advised if he behaved as though it were." (From This I Believe, 1952.)

Chart of the Transcendental Analytic

Reason

	Understanding	Imagination	
Judgments	Categories	Schemata	Principles
Quantity			
Universal	Unity	Number	Axioms of sense-intuitions: extensive magnitudes
Particular	Plurality	"	
Singular	Totality	"	
Quality			
Affirmative	Reality	Intensity	Anticipations of perception: intensive magnitudes
Negative	Negation	"	
Infinite	Limitation	"	
Relation			
Categorical	Inherence and subsistence	Permanence	Analogies of experience: permanence in all changes
Hypothetical	Causality and dependence	Succession	
Disjunctive	Community or interaction	Coexistence	
Modality			
Problematic	Possibility--impossibility	In time	Postulates of empirical thought in general
Assertoric	Existence--non-existence	certain time	
Apodeictic	Necessity--contingency	All time	